In this note, we show that for every simple game with n players the critical threshold value is at most n/4. This verifies the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz.
Introduction
Let N be a finite set of players. We call a function v : 2 N → {0, 1} monotone if v(C) v(S) for all C, S ⊆ N such that C ⊆ S. The pair (N, v) is called a simple game if v(∅) = 0, v(N ) = 1 and v is a monotone 0/1 function. We refer the reader to [7] , [6] for further reading on simple games. A simple game (N, v) partitions the collection of all possible player coalitions into two collections: the collection of winning coalitions W := {C ⊆ N : v(C) = 1} and the collection of losing coalitions L := {C ⊆ N : v(C) = 0}.
Weighted voting games are a natural family of simple games. A weighted voting game is defined by a finite set of players N and a vector p ∈ R N , p 0, p(N ) 1, where
Here, we use the notation q(C) := i∈C q i for a vector q ∈ R N and C ⊆ N . Clearly, every weighted voting game is a simple game. To show that the reverse is not true let us consider the following example from [3] . Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} for some even n and the value function v : 2 N → {0, 1} be as follows
Obviously, coalitions {2i − 1, 2i}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2} are winning while the two coalitions {1, 3, . . . , n − 1}, {2, 4, . . . , n} are losing.
If the desired vector p ∈ R N exists for Example 1, then on one side p(N ) n/2 and on the other side p(N ) < 2, showing that for n 4 this game is not a weighted voting game.
To understand whether a simple game is a weighted voting game, we could use the critical threshold value introduced in [4] . Before we define the critical threshold value of a simple game, let us define the following polyhedron
The critical threshold value can be defined as
Observe, that α < 1 if and only if the simple game (N, v) is a weighted voting game. The example in [3] shows that α can be as large as n/4, because 2 n 1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of winning coalitions while 1 2 1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of losing coalitions. Freixas and Kurz [3] conjectured that there is no simple game with a larger value of α. Here, we state the variant of the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz from [5] .
Conjecture 2 (Conjecture of Freixas and Kurz). For a simple game with n players, the collection of winning coalitions W and the collection of losing coalitions L, we have
In [5] the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz was verified for simple games with all minimal wining coalitions of size 3 and for simple games with no minimal winning coalitions of size 3. In [5] it was shown that α 2n/7 for general simple games.
Before going to the proof, we would like to say that our approach is inspired by the work of Ahmad Abdi, Gérard Cornuéjols and Dabeen Lee on identically self-blocking clutters [1] (Section 3).
Proof
To prove the conjecture we reformulate, strengthen and only then verify it. A coalition C, C ⊆ N is called a cover of W if C has at least one common player with every coalition in W. We call the collection of covers of W the blocker of W and denote it by b(W)
1 [2] . Due to the definition of simple games, we have
Hence, the critical threshold value can be reformulated as follows
Here, p, q stands for the scalar product of two vectors p and q. 
showing that α n/4 and hence α = n/4 by Theorem 5.
On the other hand, from the proof of Theorem 5 we know that if α = n/4 then p ⋆ = 1 2 1 is an optimal solution for min{ p ⋆ , q : q ∈ Q(W)} with value n/4. Let us show that In the same way as the proof of Theorem 5, we could show that
where q ⋆ is the optimal solution for the program min{ q 2 : q ∈ conv{r ∈ {0, 1} N : r ∈ Q(W)}} .
Thus, if α equals n/4, then q ⋆ = 
Open Questions
The question about asymptotic behaviour of the critical threshold value of complete simple games remains open. These are the games with a total order of players by "winning power". Freixas and Kurz [3] conjectured that the critical threshold value of a complete simple game with n players equals O( √ n).
Recently, in [5] it was shown that the critical threshold value of such games is O ((ln n) √ n).
